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First, psychological experience always implies a connection, a relationship: with another 
person, with cultural tools or language, or with the natural environment. Life is a network of 
relationships.
Second, psychological experience is always dynamic and changing. The simplest visual 
perception requires a change, either in a movement of the object or a movement of the eyes, 
head, or body. Thoughts and feelings fluctuate in a continuous pattern of change. These patterns 
of change themselves change as people develop. Life is a series of changes.
On the other hand, part of psychological experience is a sense of one’s uniqueness (the 
self) and a sense of one’s permanence through time (identity). How can this occur? How can 
people have a sense of themselves and their stability over time if psychological experience is 
fundamentally relational and dynamic?
The answer proposed in this chapter is that people experience the changes in their 
relationships according to different types of emotion and that emotions provide information 
about the self. Consistent with the two premises, emotions are conceptualized as dynamic 
experiences of harm or benefit, perceived as personally meaningful with respect to the 
individual's changing relationship with the environment (Barrett, 1995; Campos & Barrett, 1984; 
Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). According to Frijda, 
emotional experience "is glued, as it were, to its object, coinciding entirely with apprehending 
that object's nature and significance . . . [negative] emotional experience is perception of horrible 
objects, insupportable people, oppressive events" (Frijda, 1986, p. 188). And de Rivera suggests 
that, "emotions may be conceived as existing between people, as various sorts of attractions and 
repulsions . . . which transform their bodies and perceptions" (de Rivera, 1992, p. 200). As we 
shall see, this perspective suggests that there are an unlimited variety of emotional experiences 
corresponding to the limitless variety of relationship dynamics.
From the perspective of this paper, emotion is one way of discovering the meaning of a 
relationship for the self and hence, the unique position of the self in the relationship. Over long
Begin with two premises.
periods of time, the perception of consistency in one’s emotional experience begins to yield a 
sense of permanence of the self through time. In this sense, perception and emotion are two 
aspects of the same process of discovering the way in which the self is related to the world 
(Dewey, 1934; Stern, 1985).
THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON SELF AND EMOTION
Before developing this perspective, a few words may be said about why it is different 
from traditional models of self and emotion. If one begins with a different premise, that each 
person is a unique individual from the outset, then the existence of a sense of self does not need 
to be explained. The self-contained individual, existing as a totality independent of the surround, 
is one of the main features of Western culture inherited from Greek philosophy (Levinas, 1969). 
In contrast to the view presented here, of emotion as the perceived meaning of relationships, 
emotions in the individual perspective are conceived as basic «internal» states or motivations, 
generated from the neurophysiology in response to an «external» cause. In this perspective, 
individuals «have» an emotion that requires expression, via action, with respect to the 
environment. The individual perspective predicts that there are a limited number of discretely 
different emotions that are genetically programmed into the neural system and become available 
to define harms and benefits for the individual.
The relational perspective, by contrast, sees individuals as open and changing 
components in systems of relationships. Cooperative communication, for example, brings people 
together to create an outcome that no single person could achieve. Consider choral singing. 
Individual singers have different parts and vocal ranges that when mixed, form a coherent aural 
aesthetic. The concept of co-regulation describes this type of social process that is jointly created 
(Fogel, 1993). When co-regulating, individuals’ behavior in the group is not theirs alone, but the 
manifestation of the group’s dynamics in each of their bodies. In the same way, emotion is 
experienced as harms and benefits within individual bodies but it reflects the body’s experience 
of a relational dynamic. According to Gergen (1991, p. 157), for example,
If it is not individual ‘I’s who create relationships, but relationships 
that create the sense of ‘I,’ then ‘I’ ceases to be the center of 
success or failure, the one who is evaluated well or poorly, and so 
on. Rather, ‘I’ am just an I by virtue of playing a particular part in 
a relationship.
The relational perspective does not deny that people often perceive their part in a 
communicative process as «their own» contribution or «their own» failure to make an effective 
contribution. One the contrary, these attributions are one of the undeniable manifestations of the 
self, the sense of one’s own uniqueness. Each singer in the chorus manifests the group dynamics 
in a unique way, experiencing their own part in the larger musical creation. The relational 
perspective described in this chapter does, however, seek a principled explanation of the sense of 
self. How, in fact, does the self arise in spite of the obvious fact of ecology: that everyone and 
everything is merely an incomplete location in a network of relationships comprising the cultural 
and physical world?
There are different ways in which the sense of uniqueness can be experienced and they 
differ according to the time scale in which the individual is a participant in a relationship. At 
each time scale, a different aspect of self arises with respect to a different type of emotional 
process. In this chapter, three time scales are discussed. They are summarized in Table 1 and 
introduced briefly here, followed by a more detailed description in the remainder of the chapter. 
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The first time scale is microseconds and seconds. Even during these very brief periods of 
time, individuals can have a sense of their orientation with respect others corresponding to 
emotions related to approach or avoidance. The second time scale is minutes, hours, or longer. 
This is the time it takes for orientations to form into a sequential pattern of communication. 
During this time scale, individuals can have a sense of their unique role in the authorship of the 
pattern. Authorship is a sense of one’s agency and occurs with regard to emotions such as 
security vs. insecurity or togetherness vs. loneliness. The third time scale occurs over years. This
is the period of time it takes for individuals to have a sense of the uniquely enduring aspects of 
themselves, their identity. These experiences typically occur with respect to emotions such as 
harmony or conflict, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with oneself over time. At any given moment 
in time during the life course, the individual may experience the self and its related emotions at 
all three time scales. These ideas are developed in the remainder of this chapter.
ORIENTATION
This section discusses the emergence of the most basic form of self, the sense of a unique 
orientation with respect to a relationship. In order to co-regulate, people orient their actions 
toward the other within a period of microseconds and seconds. Orientation is not a fully formed 
action system with a pre-defined goal but orientation may become more goal-like during the 
process of co-regulation.
Orientation is similar to the concept of intention defined as «behavioral object 
directedness» (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Vedeler, 1991). In this case, an object can be a physical 
object or a person. Intention implies an orientation movement of the body relative to someone or 
something rather than toward some fully formed goal. Because there is always an orientation, it 
means that there is always an intention. Trevarthen’s (1993, p. 123) concept of «motive . . . a 
readiness for perceiving information needed for acting,» is similar. Orientation is also similar to 
the concept of «dialogical position» of actual or imagined selves (Hermans & Kempen, 1993), 
one’s stance vis-a-vis another. Another related concept is «action readiness,» a propensity to 
move toward or away accompanied by an emotional experience of approach or avoidance toward 
a particular relationship (Frijda, 1986). Frijda’s position is the only one that makes clear that 
orientations are connected to particular forms of emotional experience. Since there is always an 
orientation, there is always some kind of emotional experience.
Orientations can be relatively open or relatively closed. Postural orientations, for 
example, may differ with respect to whether stance, gaze direction, and limb position is open or 
closed vis-a-vis a partner. Mental orientations differ with respect to the willingness to embrace 
or reject the consideration of concepts or ideas. More open orientations allow a freedom in how
the process unfolds and permit creativity within the system. More closed orientations reflect 
degrees of control over how the process unfolds. The dimension of open-closed highlights the 
emotional aspect of orientation. Open orientations correspond to emotional attraction or a feeling 
of wanting to approach the other. Closed orientations correspond to feelings of repulsion or 
withdrawal.
The sense of uniqueness, the self, arises in part because orientations imply the location of 
the self with respect to the environment. Orientations may be directed from the individual 
toward the environment or they may be receptive, from the environment toward the individual 
(Vedeler, 1994). When orientations are more directed, individuals have the experience of acting 
on the environment with varying degrees of control. When orientations are more receptive, one 
has the experience of being influenced by the environment or of «abandoning ourselves to the 
world» (Vedeler, 1994, p. 346). There is typically an alternative between being directed or 
receptive.
Hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, moonlight and 
sunlight, present themselves in our recollection not preeminently 
as sensory contexts but as certain kinds of symbioses, certain ways 
the outside world has of invading us and certain ways we have of 
meeting that invasion (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 194).
Thus, although orientations are inherently relational -  implying a relationship between 
self and other -  individuals can perceive their position vis-a-vis others. Since the individual 
occupies a location in physical and psychological space, the body is perceived as fundamentally 
in an orientation because all movement is from one location and toward another, either directed 
away from the self or toward the self. All psychological processes, including thought and 
narration, have an orientation because of their fundamental embodiment (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Yasuo, 1987).
The self’ s uniqueness, then, is experienced from its particular perspective at one pole of a 
relational orientation (Gibson, 1966; 1979; Michaels & Carello, 1981; Reed, 1987). Recent
discoveries suggest that this type of self awareness can be directly perceived at an early age. 
Human infants, for example, can identify the movements of their own bodies with respect to the 
environment and other persons, the so-called «ecological self» that differs from the mirror 
recognition of self at 18 months (Butterworth, 1995; Fogel, 1995; Legerstee, Anderson, & 
Schaffer, 1998; Rochat, 1995; Rochat & Hespos, 1997; Stern, 1985).
The dynamics of co-regulation, and the continual shifts of orientation also play a role in 
establishing a particular emotional quality to the sense of a unique self. Because to co-regulate 
one must continually re-adjust one’s actions based on the continuously changing actions of the 
partner, individuals can experience their relative degree of creativity as a participant in a 
relationship (Fogel, 1993; Ganguly, 1976; Pickering, 1999; Whitehead, 1978). Because the self 
is inherently creative, the experience of uniqueness is not an experience of being but an 
experience of becoming, a process of improvisation during communication (Bakhtin, 1981; 
Barclay, 1994; Boesch, 1991; Bosma, 1995; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Jansz, 1995; Josephs, 
1998; Shotter, 1981). It is thought that the earliest awareness of self in human infancy, called the 
emergent self, is just this experience of being a unique participant in the creative process (Stern, 
1985).
A similar perspective is offered by philosophies of intersubjectivity (Buber, 1958; 
Jopling, 1993; Levinas, 1969; de Qunicey, 1998) in which self and other arise as a result of 
communication and dialogue. During the give and take of ordinary discourse, each person’s 
statements are countered by the other so that mutual reformulation (co-regulation) of meaning is 
required. As speakers make clearer their point of view to listeners, that point of view becomes 
clearer to the speakers themselves (Hermans & Kempen, 1993).
The sense of self that arises from these creative processes, however, is most likely to be 
experienced just following the creative act or creative moment. It is necessary for the experience 
to achieve a resolution. After have peak experiences of creative flow, as in mountain climbing or 
musical performance, adults report feeling a sense of uniqueness that did not occur during the 
experience itself (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 1996). Dewey (1934) has pointed out that there is a
crucial difference between experiencing (being in the flow of activity) and having an experience. 
The latter implies a sense of both participation and completeness from which a characteristic 
emotion may be felt as well as a sense of self. This leads us to consider the issue of the 
completion of orientations into events.
Events
At particular times during the process of communication, the creative flow becomes 
punctuated. There is a change from experiencing as flow to having an experience. An experience 
is a sense that the flow has coalesced, a noticeable pattern has formed, a pattern that will be 
called an event. The sense of one’s uniqueness comes into being as a concrete event that emerges 
from the orientational flow (Fogel & Branco, 1997; Kegan, 1982; Pedrosa, Carvalho, & Imperio- 
Hamburger, 1997; Sampson, 1989; Whitehead, 1978).
Events are the psychological experiences o f real or actual entities such as objects, 
actions, feelings, or thoughts. When we experience something as real, we are participating in a 
process by which orientations have coalesced into an awareness of events, a process that may 
take only microseconds (Whitehead, 1978). The emergence of events is the perception of an 
island of stability against the background of the dynamic flux of change. From a dynamic 
systems theory perspective, events are self-organizing p rocesses that owe their stability to the 
mutual interactions among the elements in the relationship and not to the existence of stored, 
fully formed representations inside the individual (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Thelen & Smith,
1994).
As orientations coalesce into events, there is the simultaneous emergence o f a stable 
emotional experience of  value vis-a-vis the relationship between self and environment (Hermans 
& Kempen, 1993). All events are experienced as inherently emotional (Dewey, 1934). These 
orientational emotions yield the experience of values such as good or bad, approach or avoid, 
accept or reject, tasteful or distasteful, pleasure or pain. Value is the most basic form of 
awareness, occurring on a time scale of seconds and microseconds. Value is also the earliest 
form of awareness in human development. Newborn infants have sophisticated approach and
withdrawal reflexes by which they can evaluate a wide range of sensory experiences. Newborns 
suck sweet liquids and spit out bitter ones; they turn toward voices with particular pitch and 
intensity levels and not others; they follow the movements of high contrast visual objects and not 
others (Fogel, 1996). These experiences of value are centers of psychological consistency, called 
the emergent self (Stern, 1985) by which the self’s unique relationship to the environment can be 
established.
To the extent that orientations are open, rather than closed, they are perceived with some 
sense of uncertainty. When engaged in an open conversation, for example, there are flow periods 
in which the outcomes are unknown and participants are willing to remain in an relatively 
uncertain co-creative process. Events, although they appear as uncertainty in orientations is 
reduced over time, always have some orientational aspect that leads them from present to future. 
Although it is theoretically useful to distinguish orientations from events, in practice there are 
neither pure orientations nor pure events: orientations coalesce into events but events-as- 
orientations set the stage for the next events (James, 1976; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Whitehead, 
1978). Events, therefore, can be more or less orientational, referring to the possibility for the 
event to become transformed in the process of co-regulation. In science, for example, the ideal 
situation is that concepts are working models. The scientist is supposed to maintain an 
orientational stance toward the data using those concepts but the concepts are always open to 
modification. The values that are perceived as part of an event are rarely finalized. They are 
always open to a process of re-valuation.
Becoming and being: Balancing orientation and eventOrientations and events are two 
related aspects of awareness of self. The former is connected with the awareness of becoming 
and the latter with the awareness of being, the former with change and the latter with stability. 
Within individual experience, there are moments when being and becoming are present in a 
fruitful and self-sustaining balance. One remains open to change while at the same time has a 
sense of stability and uniqueness. In an open conversation, for example, the participants begin 
with a frame of mind, a loosely defined set of orientations that partake of their individuality. Via
co-regulation, each person opens to change but that change is integrated into their prior 
orientations, thus preserving their individuality and at the same time changing it. In this case, 
there is an intimate and directly perceived connection between self and other that has the special 
quality of being co-creative. One is aware of the self, one is aware that the other is a self, and one 
is aware that the emergence of those selves (as events) depends upon the co-creative process (as 
mutual orientations) and the self-events are always orientational. Co-being arises from and flows 
into co-becoming.
Buddhist thinking refers to the concept of dependent co-arising, which refers to the 
awareness of the creative process by which co-becoming is balanced with co-being. In this 
process, the individuals become aware that their attempts to ground themselves in the 
permanence of being is set against the background of the continuous living flow of becoming 
(Pickering, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Wilber, 1979). When individuals become 
fully open to each other during interpersonal encounters, the experience of orientation toward 
each other is both indeterministic and endless, the experience of «infinity» (Levinas, 1969). In 
these meetings, the other person becomes the self and vice-versa, there is no sense of being 
directed or receptive, only a feeling of selfhood dissolving into union. One sees the same 
humanity in the other and meets the other without reserve and in the fullness of other’s 
vulnerability to be changed. These have been called «I-Thou» as opposed to «I-It» relationships 
(Buber, 1958).
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This balance between being and becoming is only one part of the spectrum of self­
awareness. One can shift the balance either more toward becoming or more toward being (see 
Figure 1.
One pole of self-awarness is that of pure becoming, when experience is completely 
orientational. One is oriented toward another person or thing without an end or resolution. There 
is a merger with that thing, the experience «of eternity, the complete absorption in being" 
(Loewald, 1980, p.141). Because the sense of self arises only as orientations coalesce into
events, purely orientational awareness cannot involve a sense of self. In Fridja’s (1985) view, for 
example, emotional experience has this character. One you attack someone or something in rage, 
for example, there is a complete absorption in that thing or person (as when a person says, «I 
completely lost myself,» or «I didn’t know what I was doing.» At the time of making such 
statements, one is reflecting on having had an experience o f anger. During the experience, 
however, there is no sense of I or you. In relationships, partners fail to provide each other with 
closure and confirmation for their actions. When infant self-initiated acts are not facilitated by 
the family system to help the infant appreciate what acts lead to what consequences, for example, 
then the inner experience will not be felt as the infant's own (Sander, 1962).
The other pole of self awareness is pure being, when events lose their orientational 
character. There is no change because no matter the orientation, the result is the same event. 
These are "experiences of fragmentation" such that "each instant loses its relation to any other 
instant and stands by itself" (Loewald, 1980, p.143). One feels estrangement, depression, 
helplessness, depersonalization, and alienation when faced with unchanging circumstances, 
stubborn people, irreconcilable differences, chronic tensions or anxieties, or persistent negative 
emotions. In these cases, the self fills one’s awareness with a kind of heaviness. Thoughts and 
emotions are self-focused and attempts to orient away from the self typically flounder in a sense 
of self-negation or self-inflation. Being lost or losing all of one’s freedoms may lead to this 
experience of an absence of self.
Periods of being or becoming may last only seconds or minutes, as when the resolution of 
a communication process takes longer than expected, or much longer periods as in chronic 
depression. The orientational experience of self, therefore, is not a static, stored, or structural 
thing. It is an appearance and disappearance, a coming and going. In conversation, for example, 
one goes between a selfless merger with the other, an awareness of a co-created self experienced 
in the effort to dialogue, or a heightened focus on one’s own needs at the expense of the other.
In athletics and other movement activities one alternates from concentration to flow, from an
awareness of the self-other relationship and its implications for action and emotion, to selfless 
immersion in the moment, or to excessive shame or pride at winning or losing.
Ideally, then, a sense of a unique self occurs when dynamically unfolding orientations 
coalesce into stable events, each having a particular emotional quality and a particular 
connection between self and other. In the same way that orientations self-organize dynamically 
into events during microseconds and seconds, observation suggests that events are perceived to 
self-organize into sequential patterns of events over minutes, hours, or days. These sequential 
patterns of events in communication systems are called frames. The sequential coherence of 
events and its connection to the self is the topic of the next section of this paper.
ATTTHORSHTP
The psychological coherence of patterns of event sequences is captured by the concept of 
frame. Frames are sequences o f events that have a coherent theme, that take place in a specific 
location, and that involve particular forms o f mutual co-orientation between participants.
Frames have a temporal organization -- a beginning, middle, and end -- in which the events in 
the frame cohere (Bateson, 1955; Fogel, 1993; Goffman, 1974; Jones, 1990; Kendon, 1985). 
Examples of frames are greetings, topics of conversation, conflicts, or children's social games. 
Frames are coherent patterns that result from self-organizing processes.
Because events are partly orientational, the events in a sequence can change in order to 
establish a psychological relationship with each other. In this way, all the events in the frame are 
co-constructed with all the others, an example of self-organization. In the same way that events 
coalesce and become stable from the dynamics of orientations, frames coalesce as coherent 
patterns out of the dynamics of event sequences. Because of these psychological stabilities in the 
flow of action over time, individuals have the opportunity to perceive a stable sense of self in 
relation to the frame.
Frames are similar to narratives, the latter referring primarily to coherent sequences of 
verbal communication. Narratives have a stable theme that emerges from the self-organization of 
the events, they have an orientational direction of flow over time that motivates the movements
of the actors and events (Ginsburg, 1985; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Haviland & Kahlbaugh, 
1993; Jones, 1990; Ricoeur, 1983). Single events are created in a period of microseconds and 
seconds, enough time for one to experience an approach or withdrawal orientation. Narratives, 
on the other hand, are assembled over longer periods of time, over minutes or hours or even 
longer periods. At this time scale the individual can perceive new stable aspects of the self, 
beyond simple orientation and emotional value.
As the individual becomes aware of the narrative/frame as a whole unit (e.g., a particular 
form of play or conflict in a dyad or group) the narrative is perceived as an event in itself. The 
same considerations that apply to the prior discussion of orientations and events can apply to 
narratives. The perception of the narrative as whole event can occur in microseconds or seconds, 
while at the same time the individual can also experience the actual unfolding of the narrative 
over minutes, hours or days. In this way, the entire history and future of frames that extend for 
long periods of time can come into existence as an event in the present (Fogel, 1993; Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962).
Some theorists (Stern, 1985; Tomkins, 1962) suggest that a new type of emotional 
experience, different from that of orientational emotions, arises over the time scale of narratives 
and that these narrative emotions partly account for the perceived coherence of narratives. In the 
creation of a narrative emotion, the specific values of orientational emotions from each event in 
the frame do not simply sum together. Rather, the emerging coherence of the events in the frame 
is partly accounted for by the emerging coherence of a narrative emotional process that is 
perceived to link events meaningfully together through time.
Observational research suggests that each narrative emotion forms into smoothly 
unfolding temporal contours, patterns of feeling experience (Tomkins, 1962) that have been 
called «protonarrative envelopes» (Stern, 1985; 1993). These contours create «feeling qualities 
best captured by such kinetic terms as ‘crescendo,’ ‘decrescendo,’ ‘fading,’ ‘exploding,’ 
‘bursting,’ ‘elongated,’ ‘fleeting,’ ‘pulsing,’ ‘wavering’, ‘effortful,’ ‘easy,’ and so on» (Stern,
1993, p. 206). The temporal contour of a crescendo, for example, is a relatively slow build-up of 
emotion, reaching a peak and then declining rapidly.
Each narrative emotion also has a meaning for the self, the personal harms or benefits of 
the relational connections in the frame (Frijda, 1986; Stern, 1993; Tomkins, 1962). These are 
experiences that connect events over time in some meaningful way for the self. Narrative 
emotions include, therefore, experiences that take some time to unfold and that establish a 
personal relational meaning such as love vs. hate, respect vs. disrespect, security vs. insecurity, 
togetherness vs. loneliness, safety vs. threat, pride vs shame. Security can only be felt in 
reference to the consistency of interpersonal contact over the course of a frame. Security has a 
different temporal contour than other narrative emotions, a steadiness that accompanies feelings 
of enjoyment or comfort.
Narrative emotions self-organize over time through a process that magnifies or minifies 
the psychological meaning ofparticular events by focusing or diffusing the experience o f initial 
relational orientations over a sequence of events (Demos, 1982; Fogel et al., 1997; Lewis, 1995; 
Lewis, this book; Sarbin, 1986; Tomkins, 1962; 1978). Consider the following example.
Walking down a lonely street at night one hears, or thinks one hears, a sound coming from 
behind. One’s orientation (attention and posture) toward the direction of movement becomes 
changed to having more urgency and one’s orientation toward what is behind comes into 
existence for the first time as wariness. What happens next depends upon the specific way in 
which emotion magnifies or minifies this orientation. Perhaps one turns around and notices a cat, 
which minifies the potential fear and magnifies the orientation to continue at the same pace, 
lowering the potential to perceive threat. Or perhaps one turns to see a person. The subsequent 
process depends upon whether that person is a man or woman, whether he or she is following or 
merely walking in the same direction, whether there are people ahead, or street lights.
The experience of participation in frames, therefore, inevitably highlights the self in a 
particular manner. Is there anything the person can do to protect themselves from harm? To calm 
themselves? To take charge of the situation? The time scale o f narratives allows the self to be
aware o f a sense o f their own agency. I will follow Day and Tappan (1996) use of Bakhtin’s 
(1981) concept of authorship to describe that sense of agency. Authorship refers specifically to 
the sense of self that can only be experienced as a co-agent in the construction of a social 
narrative, a story about the self meant to be communicated to another person. Authorship, 
however, can vary from being to becoming, as shown in Figure 1.
Other terms for agency are similar -  self-efficacy, perceived control -  but they fail to 
explicitly specify their links to the relational dynamics. The purpose of this chapter is to show 
how particular features of self experience can be linked to the emerging stabilities present in 
communication processes at different time scales.
Authorship can also be experienced in non-verbal frames in parent-infant communication 
(Fogel, 1993; Stern, 1985). Stern (1985) refers to the sense of self that involves an awareness of 
agency and narrative emotions as the core self, which begins around the third month of life. As 
an example, my colleagues and I made weekly videotapes of mother-infant communication for 
the first year of life as mother and infant played with toy objects. The examples below came 
from one weekly session of one of the dyads at three months. In this frame, the infant is lying on 
her back on the floor and her mother is sitting beside her holding a toy rattle. The infant is 
capable of putting her hand in her mouth yet does not have the ability to reach for objects. In the 
sequence described below, however, there is a transfer of the object from the mother’s to the 
infant’s hand. How does this occur?
The infant is looking at the rattle with her hand in her mouth, 
as mother moves the rattle in the infant’s line of vision but 
out of the infant’s reach. The infant’s hand comes out of her 
mouth and moves toward the mother. At the same time, the 
mother begins to move the object toward the infant’s hand. A 
period of ten seconds ensues in which the mother adjusts the 
orientation of the rattle while the infant opens her palm and 
watches. The mother then places the rattle in the infant’s
hand. The infant grasps it and then brings the hand, 
containing the rattle, back to her mouth.
In this frame, the infant is oriented toward the self (hand-in-mouth) and at the same time 
toward the object held by the mother. The infant’s acquisition of the object, with the mother’s 
assistance, is then integrated into the same pattern of self-directed activity as the hand with the 
object is returned to the infant’s mouth. The infant’s sense of authorship in getting the object to 
her mouth arises as her orientations form into events and events form into a frame during a 
communication with the mother. It would be difficult to imagine any sense of authorship for the 
infant outside of a frame or narrative construction. One must have at least a minimal cause-effect 
sequence for the experience of self as agent. Another instance of the same frame occurs a few 
moments later, after the infant drops the rattle.
The mother moves the rattle in the infant’s line of vision and 
out of reach as the infant looks at the rattle. This time, 
however, her hand is not in her mouth but is held out in front 
of her. The mother continues to move the rattle and the 
infant looks off to the side and puts her hand in her mouth.
The mother calls her name and she turns to look at the 
mother as her hand comes out of her mouth. At this point, 
the mother tries to insert the rattle into the infant’s palm but 
the infant looks away once again. The infant turns to look at 
the rattle and the mother tries again but the infant closes her 
palm, displays a distressed expression, and turns to the side, 
fussing.
By contrasting these two examples, we can see the variability in the emergence of 
authorship between instances of the frame. In the first example, the emotion -- attentive interest 
in the object-- is oriented simultaneously toward self and toward the object. The continuation of 
that emotion depends, first of all, upon the changing communicative events within the frame, 
specifically, upon the mother and infant’s co-regulated mutual adjustment of their hands. The 
continuation of the emotion of attentive interest also appears to depend upon the connection of 
that co-regulated communication with the infant’s orientation toward the self. The object transfer 
event depends, in other words, upon the incorporation of the object into the infant’s self­
orientation (moving the hand from the mouth, to get the object, and back to the mouth). Note 
also that the temporal contour of the emotion during the successful object transfer appears to be a 
steady focus of attention on the coordination of action. The infant is more likely to have a sense 
of self as author of the narrative when the communication is co-regulated, the orientations 
become events, and the events address the emotional concerns of the self over the course of the 
frame (see Figure 1).
In the second example, the infant does not appear to have a coherent sense of authorship. 
This lack of a sense of authorship/agency is connected to the distinction, made earlier, about 
whether orientations are directed or receptive, whether one perceives a sense of control by acting 
toward the environment or whether the environment is perceived as acting on the individual. 
When orientations are open, the result is a co-regulated balance between directed and receptive 
stances, a dialogue between self and other. When receptiveness occurs in this context, it can be 
perceived as a part of the sense of authorship. In the second example, however, the experience of 
receptiveness is not pleasant for the infant and most likely is accompanied by a loss of a sense of 
perceived control over the sequence of events. The unsuccessful transfer also has a different
temporal contour of emotional experience, beginning with fluctuation rather than steady attention 
(wavering) and ending with a rapid build-up (crescendo) of distress.
In the following example, also from my research, there is a balance of being directed and 
receptive and a corresponding sense of authorship. Once infants are able to reach and grasp 
objects (about five months), they are reluctant to release them. It takes another three or four 
months for infants to learn how to give as well as to receive objects. The following example 
comes from the same dataset of weekly videotape recordings. It reports on an observation of a 
different mother-infant dyad when the infant was nine months (see Fogel, 1993, for more details 
about this example). The example is the first weekly session in which we observed the infant 
voluntarily release the object into the mother’s hand.
Mother and infant are seated across from each other at a 
child-sized table. The infant has a toy fork in his hand and 
holds it out toward his mother. As he moves the fork toward 
his mother, she begins to move her hand toward his hand.
She opens her hand in a palm up gesture just underneath the 
infant’s hand. The infant orients his hand as if to place the 
fork into the mother’s but does not release the fork. He looks 
intently at his hand and at the fork and gradually begins to 
open his hand. The tines of the fork catch on the mother’s 
open palm as she slowly begins to pull her hand back toward 
herself, but without closing her palm. At the same time and 
at the same rate, the infant’s hand continues to open. At 
some point, the fork falls into the mother’s open hand and 
she grasps it and brings it up to her chest, smiling. As she
does this, the infant watches the movement of the fork away 
from him while his hand remains extended outward and 
open. Finally, the infant gazes at his mother’s face and 
begins to smile.
In this third example, like the first example, mother and infant communicative actions 
were co-regulated into a gently increasing temporal contour. The mother’s movements of her 
hand toward her body, for example, were coordinated with the infant’s opening of his palm. The 
infant’s orientation toward concerns of the self was seen over the course of the frame in the 
intensity of the gaze at his own actions with the object and the care with which he released the 
object into the mother’s hand. The infant’s emotional experience of joy at the accomplishment of 
the object transfer, reflecting a sense of authorship within the frame, emerged from this intensity 
of interest in combination with the co-regulated communication with the mother.
This third example also shows the first instance of a new developmental achievement: the 
infant’s voluntary transfer of an object to the mother. In everyday communication, orientations 
serve the participants by providing an initial stance from which communication becomes 
possible and a relative openness to emergent and creative processes that allow communication to 
be spontaneous and to address the concerns of the participating selves. We can see from this 
example that these same properties of orientation additionally allow for the emergence of a 
developmental change, the emergence of novel events and frames that have never before 
appeared in the communication system. In the weeks following the novel object transfer event in 
the last example, a new frame of give-and-take appeared, allowing the emergence of new 
orientations that did not previously exist in this dyad and new ways of experiencing the 
authorship of the self-in-relation (the self who can give and receive with another). These new 
forms of mutual activity also brought new emotional and self experiences with them.
Development is conceptualized as a change in the process by which a system's constituents 
change each other to create a newly emergent frame, a change in the process o f change. As 
frames change developmentally, so do the corresponding experiences of self and emotion.
IDENTITY
It is possible for the individual to develop a sense of oneself over developmental time. 
Because any particular instance of framing involves an experience of self, and because framing 
involves the re-enactment of similar patterns that have occurred in the past, there is the 
possibility during frames for the individual to perceive the similarities between the present 
experience of self and the past experiences of self. Identity is the experience that the self endures 
through time and that this self through time has preferential orientations that enter into 
particular forms o f creativity, particular propensities for change and stability, and 
predispositions for particular patterns offraming (Bosma, 1995; Erikson, 1968, Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993; Lewis, 1995).
Previous authors used the term identity to mean the particular manifestation of self 
through time that begins during adolescence and involves a growing commitment to career, 
gender role, or religion. Without negating that use of the term, one can see more general 
instances of between frame comparisons that begin as early as the end of the first year of life. 
During Piaget’s third sub-stage of sensorimotor development, infants begin to compare and to 
integrate past and present schemes. During the fourth sensorimotor sub-stage, infants begin to 
use one frame as a means for another. It is at this age, for example, that infants begin to tease 
their parents, showing that they can take a past frame and transform it into a means to create 
something emotionally different in the present (Reddy, 1991). These developments indicate that 
infants develop a sense of their own agency and an understanding of the causal links between 
current actions and past actions. This is also the age at which secondary intersubjectivity
emerges, the ability to refer to a different frame outside the context of the current frame, as in 
pointing to an object in order to bring it into the discourse between mother and infant 
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). According to Stern (1985), this is the period of emergence of the 
shared self.
The coherence of the past and present in relation to the self as a whole, however, does not 
develop until the age of four years. After this age, children can consistently remember past 
experiences of themselves and weave them into a narrative account about themselves. «The 
child’s representational system can begin to ‘temporalize’ what were previously successive and 
unrelated states of the self into an organized, coherent autobiographical self-concept» (Provinelli 
& Simon, 1998, p. 189). This has been called the «proper self» (Provinelli & Simon, 1998), the 
«extended self» (Neisser, 1991), the «narrative self» (Stern, 1985), and the «autobiographical 
self» (Nelson, 1989).
What is common across all these forms of self awareness is the sense of an identity 
between frames. It could be the current frame in relation to the past (e.g., I am the self who 
typically is shy in social situations). Alternatively, it may be the current frame in relation to 
cultural frames (e.g., I am the self who is similar to a shy character in my family or community, 
or in literature, TV, or film). Identity is also about one’s relationship to cultural definitions of 
identity (I am the self who can more readily remain active in old age because there are more 
cultural models for successful aging).
Identity is experienced with respect to reference emotions involving the relative success 
of making these comparisons or o f meeting the standards implied by the comparisons. These 
emotions include satisfaction vs. dissatisfaction, harmony vs. conflict, achievement vs. failure, 
frustration vs. elation, and approval vs. disapproval. One can accept one’s self as shy in social 
situations, for example, or feel dissatisfied with one’s self because of it. One can feel in harmony
with cultural standards or in conflict. The self-comparison emotions can be observed in infants 
beginning at the end of the first year and the comparisons with others or with cultural standards 
(e.g., gender roles) emerge by the third year, both inside and outside the family (Emde & 
Oppenheim, 1995; Kitayama et al., 1995; Reddy, 1991) .
Although the topic of identity as typically construed brings up the issue of a cognitive 
representation of the self through time, I am suggesting that identity is an emotional experience -  
not cognition or representation. Following along the theme of this paper, identity is the emotional 
perception of the coherence of a relationship over a developmental time scale. Identity, like 
orientation and authorship, arises in one’s experience of being a participant in a communicative 
relationship.
Ideally, identity is created and re-created dynamically, always partly orientational, a 
balance between being and becoming. On the other hand, identity can become lost at the pole of 
becoming or centered on the self in the form of a personality disorder (cf., Figure 1 and Lewis, 
this book). On the side of becoming, identity can lose coherence, especially during periods of 
developmental change (Dunne, 1996). Individuals may experience periods during which they 
have lost their identity, as during transitions in career, marital status, or gender role (Erikson, 
1968).
Ricoeur (1996), for example, defines «narrative identity» as the personal stories that 
endure against the background of life changes, a definition that could apply at any age. Identity 
emerges in the retelling of something about the self in the past. This is because, as shown earlier, 
the self is defined in the process of communication. In autobiographical writing, authors do not 
merely recount the past but are "deciding what to make of the past narratively at the moment of 
telling" (Bruner, 1990, p. 122). Identity also arises when one selects existing cultural narratives as 
frames in which to tell one's own story. An individual may frame their identity in terms of cultural
narratives for gender, speaking as females from the perspective of stories of communion or as 
males from the perspective of stories of independence (Gergen & Gergen, 1995; Miller, Mintz, 
Hoogstra, Fung, & Potts, 1992; Mistry, 1993).
The sense of identity can be perceived as an event in realtime, as one reflects upon oneself 
across developmental time. Identity then, as an event, is partially orientational over a 
developmental time scale, becoming stabilized into an event over a period of years. In these co­
regulated dynamics, self perspectives become magnified and minified in relation to other’s 
narratives about the self and the resulting emotions (see Bosma, 1995; Haviland & Kahlbaugh, 
1993; and Lewis, 1995; for more detailed descriptions of identity/personality development).
One can move this discussion to the cultural level. The types of identity narrative in a 
culture also develop over historical time, presumably by the same types of change dynamics 
discussed earlier. During the 19th century in Western Europe and North America, gender identity 
was defined with respect to the differences between men and women. In the mid-20th century, 
androgyny became more salient as a theme in gender narratives. In the latter decades of the 20th 
century, gender narratives involve the self-construction of one’s own gender identity and sexual 
orientation (Gergen & Gergen, 1995). One of the features of the end of the 20th century is rapid 
cultural change in identity narratives. When cultural change is the backdrop for individual and 
relationship changes, the indeterminism o f self development is increased and places increasing 
demands on individuals to maintain an open orientation to change at all levels in order to allow 
identity to develop freely (Cole, 1996; Erikson, 1968; Gergen, 1991).
TTME AND THE SELF
The experience of self, then, can occur with respect to different time scales: events, 
frames, and development, shown in Table 1. One can expand the ideas in Table 1 by including 
longer time scales. The developmental time scale, mentioned above, refers to the changes that
occur every few years. The individual can become aware of cumulative changes, leading to 
increasingly complex senses of self and emotion. The particular form of identity that begins in 
adolescence seems to require a time scale of 15 years or more before the individual becomes 
aware of the frame comparisons related to the self’s role commitments. This may be due in part 
because one needs the lengthy perspective on self and also in order to integrate the complex array 
of identity frames of the culture into a view of the self. According to Erikson’s (1950) theory of 
psychosocial development, each stage of the life course brings with it a newly emergent sense of 
self, involving different types of self experiences and different kinds of emotions. Preschool 
children, for example, take on an identity in the eyes of others, feeling pride and shame 
(emotions related to their view of how others perceive them) for the first time. As young adults 
make choices about marriage or career, they acquire sociocultural identities and feel emotions of 
commitment or alienation. The older adult becomes aware of an identity of a person who dies, of 
the uniqueness of his or her life course, and experiences emotions such as wisdom and 
detachment. As people near endings, especially those at the end of life, emotional awareness 
becomes heightened as well as a corresponding appreciation for one’s unique lifecourse 
(Carstendrn, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999).
In addition to the time scale of life course duration, as described in the last paragraph, 
change itself has an emotional meaning for the self, at all time scales (Fogel et al., 1997).
Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the 
change itself is one o f the things immediately experienced 
(James, 1976, p. 25)
A critical dimension in defining and describing emotional 
experience, therefore, focuses on the concept of changing 
states (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993, p. 281).
The emotions o f change are certainty vs. uncertainty, stability vs. instability, determinism vs. 
indeterminism, order vs. chaos. Note that these emotions reflect the types of experience along the 
pole of being and becoming (see Figure 1). Order emerges on the being side while chaos may be 
felt on the becoming side. These emotions of change, as well as experiences that appear at 
different time scales of emergence, are summarized in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 Here
The emotions of change refer to the relative changeability of the other emotions. During 
transitions in romantic relationships, for example, the relational emotions may fluctuate rapidly, 
between security and insecurity or between joy and despair. These fluctuations create the change 
emotions of uncertainty and chaos. It is by these emotions of change during transitions in 
togetherness or intimacy that one recognizes the importance of the relationship for the self.
The maintenance of creativity and orientational flexibility in the face these uncertainties 
reflects a balance of being and becoming and is thought to facilitate optimal developmental 
change (Antonofsky & Sagy, 1990; Block & Block, 1980; Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 1996; Isen, 
1990; Malatesta & Wilson, 1988). Change, therefore, can be experienced either as highly creative 
or as distressing and disorganizing, depending upon how individuals are supported in their 
important relationships while in the process of changing. When most creatively balanced, 
individuals may seek change, magnifying their emotions o f fear or success, uncertainty or 
certainty, in order to continue acting near the edge of  chaos. At other times, people may find  
change more aversive, keeping their emotions within prescribed boundaries and maintaining the 
stability ofpreviously ”safe ” frames for communication and emotion when faced with 
perturbations that are likely to lead to change (Antonofsky & Sagy, 1990; Butz, Duran, & Tong, 
1995; Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Lewis, 1995; Rogers, 1961; Stern, 1985).
Both positive and negative emotions, then, may be important for navigating periods of 
change because all emotions provide information about the self’s concerns in the relationship.
The idea that emotions can be usefully magnified in the service of change runs counter to 
traditional emotion narratives from Western culture. In these narrarives, emotions are irrational 
impulses, originating from the inside the individual, driving us to act in involuntary ways. 
Traditional Western narratives for mature identity, on the contrary, reflect themes of rationality, 
self-determination, and responsibility. «Emotions, with their alleged irrationality, would seem to 
seriously undermine this cultural ideal of personhood» (Fischer & Jansz, 1995, p. 61). In adopting 
these traditional narratives, we devalue the opportunities of change, times when events become 
more orientational and emotions more intense and unpredictable (Butz et al., 1995).
There are a diverse variety of therapeutic methods -- ranging from psychotherapy, to body 
and movement awareness, to meditation and spiritual practices -- involving the enhancement of 
flexibility and creativity in the face of pain or changing, unpredictable circumstances 
(Antonovsky, 1993; Rogers, 1961; Wilber, 1979). The goal is finding a balance, which in the 
perspective of this paper, is optimal creativity and optimal stability, a balance between being and 
becoming, and a heightened awareness of being a co-participant in a relational process. These 
approaches can help individuals develop an alternative cultural identity with narratives for 
connection between persons in caring relationships with others and with the environment and for 
trusting the inherent value of emotional experience to guide one through the currents of chaos and 
change.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have presented a view of communication, self, and emotion based on the 
primacy o f relationships and their change dynamics. Each time scale allows the individual to 
perceive different aspects of the self. It is as if these different avenues of self awareness are the
natural consequence of the time it takes for events on different time scales to emerge in 
relationships and for the psyche to detect them. In addition, single events, authorship events, and 
identity events can all be perceived in the present and at the same time. Single events can change 
a frame more readily than they can change a culture or an identity but theoretically, every single 
event is in some way part of the events that change at all levels. One of the issues left unexplored 
in this chapter is a detailed accounting of the co-regulation that occurs across these different 
levels.
Also unexplored in this chapter is the relationship of the authorship/identity system to 
events that emerge over longer time scales. These include historical, phylogenetic, geological, and 
cosmological time scales. The way in which events are constituted from orientations depends in 
part upon the sensorimotor, emotional, and cognitive systems that evolved on this planet. The 
main narratives of culture depend as much on interpersonal relationships and their changes as on 
relationships with the earth and its changes.
Another unexplored topic is the historical pathways by which orientations and events enter 
into frames and by which frames enter into identities and by which events. Each specific single 
event or frame in a relationship has a history. In some cases, events and frames form and later 
disappear, with no perceptible effects on the system. In other cases, particular frames and events 
become amplified into seeds for developmental and historical change (Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Lyra 
& Winegar, 1997). These relational-historical dynamics are part of a more complete 
understanding of communication systems and the self.
More can be said about the role of the body in self awareness. The sense of self and 
identity emerges from relational dynamics because the body is specialized to create emotional 
experiences for the temporal contours and relational meanings of events within frames. And
reciprocally, the particular features of orientations, events, frames, and cultures owe their identity 
to the possibilities of emotion as experienced by the human body.
Research methods were not discussed in detail. In general, research that follows from the 
theoretical principles in this chapter must be focused on the process of change over time by which 
orientations coalesce into events. This requires a sequential analytic approach as illustrated in the 
narratives taken from my research. It is essential to track how a psychological process unfolds 
over time -- at all time scales -- in the context of co-regulated communication between the person 
and the environment. It is important to understand what kinds of sequences promote open 
compared to closed orientations and how developmental creativity can be facilitated in 
relationships.
Writing this chapter was an opportunity to author my own theoretical identity on the 
problem of how the self is created in the midst of relational changes, to become aware of my 
position in the scholarly community, and to realize where I am incomplete. I was comforted by 
the work of many others who have authored narratives of relationship and the indeterministic 
creativity of emotion and self. The individualistic narrative forms of the scientific culture are 
changing as they co-regulate with narratives of dynamic systems and relationships. In this fluid 
culture of change, the challenge is to create a relatively stable narrative identity granting 
autonomy within connection, accepting self loss against the background of self emergence, 
preserving individuality as a part of the human relational ecology.
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Table 1. Time scales and self experience. It takes only seconds to become aware of some aspects 
of the self and years to become aware of other aspects of the self.
Topic Event Frame Development
Time Scale Seconds Minutes, Hours Years
Sense of Self Orientation Authorship/Agency Identity
Type of Experience Orientational
emotions
Narrative Emotions Reference Emotions
Table 2. Summary of different types of emotion according to type of change process.
Type of Change Process Emotional Experience
Orientation to Event Orientational emotions: approach vs. withdrawal, directed vs. 
receptive, open vs. closed
Event to Frame Narrative Emotions: Love vs. hate, respect vs. disrespect, 
security vs. insecurity, togetherness vs. loneliness, safety vs. 
threat, pride vs. shame
Frame to Frame Comparison Reference Emotions : Harmony vs. conflict, satisfaction vs. 
dissatisfaction, approval vs. disapproval, achievement vs. 
failure, elation vs. frustration
All Changes Change Emotions: Certainty vs. uncertainty, stability vs. 
instability, determinism vs. indeterminism, order vs. chaos

Figure 1. The spectrum of self-awareness, from being to becoming.
Primarily Being  
□-----------------------------
Events are stable 
Orientations are minimal 
The self is isolated
Balance o f  Being and Becoming
Events are orientational 
Orientations flow into events 
The self is co-regulated
Primarily Becoming 
---------------------------------------------□
Events do not coalesce 
Orientations are salient 
The self is lost or merged
